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A SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
by Daniel D. Coughlin
On November 17,1993, the UnitedStates House of Representativesgave final approval to the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and its side agreement on the Environment
(Cooperation Agreement).' Within the fol-
lowing week, the United States Senate over-
whelmingly passed the NAFTA and the
Mexican Senate followed suit, clearing the
last legislative hurdles to implementation of
the treaty which creates the world's largest
free-trade zone.2 The NAFTA officially went
into effect on January 1, 1994, and will
gradually eliminate most trade tariffs and
non-tariff barriers to trade.3 Much of the
debate prior to Congressional approval of
the NAFTA centered on its potential to cause
a loss of American jobs.4 Many are also
concerned about the effect the agreement
will have on the environments of all Parties5
to the NAFTA, especially along the Mexican-
U.S. border.6  At the same time, some
Americans felt that the NAFTA's provisions
may threaten national sovereignty by pre-
empting existing environmental regulations.7
After negotiation of theoriginalNAFTA
text in 1992,8 many American commenta-
tors and environmentalists expressed con-
cern over the possibility of accelerated envi-
ronmental decay in Mexico under the treaty.'
Those concerns especially focused on the
probability that Northern manufacturers
would hasten their departure for Mexico to
take advantage of cheaper labor costs and
Mexico's weaker pollution laws and enforce-
ment mechanisms.10 Such concems are no
doubt due to the recent deterioration of the
border environment, caused in large part by
new American manufacturing in the
"maquiladora" area of Mexico." Mexico has
not vigorously enforced hazardous waste
regulations in this northem border region of
Mexico." This helped transform manyMexi-
can border cities into industrial wastelands.' 3
Environmentalists are concerned that the
NAFTA's elimination of tariffs on imports to
the U.S. will increase the flight of American
manufacturers to the maquiladora region
and exacerbatethe pollutionproblemthere."4
In his 1992 campaign, President Clinton
called forasupplementalagreement protect-
ing the environments of the NAFTA na-
tions.'5 The Cooperation Agreement pro-
'U.S. House of Representatives Passes North American Free Trade Agreement: NAFTA Backing is Key Win forClinton, Facts on File World News Digest, Nov. 18, 1993,
available in Westlaw, PTS-News database; North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 11, 14, 17, 1992, U.S. Department of State, available in Westlaw, IELdatabase
[hereinafter NAFTA]; North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sep. 13, 1993, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, available in Westlaw, IEL database,
Implemented at 19 U.S.C. §3472 (hereinafter Cooperation Agreement].
2U.S., Mexican Senates Approve NAFTA, Facts on File World News Digest, Nov. 25, 1993; Helen Dewar, NAFTA Wins Final Congressional Test, WAsH. PoSr, Nov. 21,
1993, at Al; Lars-Erik Nelson, Clinton Scores in His Own Endrone, NEWsDAY, Nov. 21, 1993, at 56.
3 William Carlile, NAFTA Opens Borders Like Never Before, Asu. REPUsuc, Jan. 2, 1994, at Al; Carl F. Schwenker, Note, Protecting the Environment and U.S.
Competitiveness in the Era of Free Trade: A Proposal, 71 TEK. L REv. 1355, *3 (1993) (describing the general scope of the treaty).
4 See Maryanne Foronjy, Note, Mexico and the North American Free Trade Agreement-Growing Clean?, 4 FoRDHAM ENvTL. L REP. 211, *3-5 (1993); Schwenker, supra
note 3, at *4-7. See also Jane Bussey, Teamsters See Trouble Down the Line, Muise HaeoA-SuN, Dec. 5, 1993, at 1K; Richard Allen, DAuAs MoRIENG News, Sep 13 ., 1993,
at 1D; Nelson.supra note 2; Anthony DePalma, Vague Mexico Wage Pledge Clouds Free Trade Agreement, N.Y. Tus, Sep. 29,1993, atAl; ScottHaggett, North American
Free Trade Agreement Appears Ready to Fly, FiN. Post, Sep. 25, 1993, at 22; Richard Alm, Real Fight for Free Trade Begins Now in Congress, DAnAs MomRNG NEws, Aug.
19, 1993, at 1A.
5 Throughout this text the term "Party" or "Parties" refers to the national governments of Mexico, Canada, and the Unitqd States. This is also how the Cooperation Agreement
refers to them. This should help distinguish these three govemments from a general "third party". See generally Cooperation Agreement, supro note 1.
*SeeForonjy, supra note 4, at *3; Side Agreements to NAFTA Signed, 16INrLEwvn.. REP. 669(BNA) (1993) (hereinafterAgreements Signedl; Steve Chamovitz, NAFTA:
An Analysis of Its Environmental Provisions, 23 Exvn. L REP. 10067, *1-2 (1993); Mexican Border Utility Deal, N.Y. TWIEs, October 13, 1993, at D5.
7 See Agreements Signed, supra note 6; Jima Ikegawa, Comment, NAFTA: How will it Affect U.S. Environmental Regulations. 6 TRAsur's L 225, *12-15 (1993).
8The NAFIA was signed December 17, 1992 by former President George Bush, Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney.
See Anthony Baldanza and Fasken C. Godfrey, Canadian Foreign Investment Review after NAFTA, 5 MERORs & AcqusmoNs i CANADA, No. 9 (1993).
9 See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
0 See Foronly, supra note 4, at *13-14.
n AL; "Maquiladora' Is not defined in Spanish. See THE NEw Woan SPAfH-ENGusH AmN ENwSH-SpAssn DcnoNAny (1991). The name is used by commentators to describe
the northern border region of Mexico where American manufacturers have recently moved their plants to use Mexican labor and import goods back to the U.S. See Foronly,
supra note 4, at *13. This is facilitated by an agreement between the two governments whereby U.S. companies may establish plants in Mexico and import raw materials for
them duty-free. Id. They then send finished goods back to the U.S. or another country of the raw materials' origin. Id. If sent to the U.S., the goods re-enter the country duty.
free as well, subject to a value added tax on the cost of finishing. Id. Though this industry experienced continual growth up until the NAFTA was implemented, it reached its
peak from 1983-1988. Id. at *14.
SSee Foronjy, supra note 4, at *14.
'
3 id.
"Id. at *4. See Klka de la Garza, Linking Trade Growth and the Environment, 23 ENvL L 701 (1993) (urging President Clinton to provide a source of funding for cleaning
up environmental problems in the border area).
5 Bill Clinton, Expanding Trade and Creating American Jobs, Address at North Carolina State University (Oct. 4, 1992), in 23 ENvrt. L 683, 686 (1992).
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vides a new and fairly comprehensive frame-
work for the Parties to deal with such prob-
lems. 6 The United States and Mexico also
established a bilateral Border Environmental
Cooperation Commission (BECC).' 7 The
BECC deals with problems of cleaning up
existing border pollution and preventing such
pollution from growing as commerce grows
there under the NAFTA.18
Initially, this Comment will provide an
overview of the Cooperation Agreement
which was supposed to allay environmental-
ists' fears about the impact of the original
NAFTA. It then will outline chief concerns
raised by environmentalists when the origi-
nal NAFTA text was signed and discuss the
extent to which the Cooperation Agreement
satisfies these concerns.




The Cooperation Agreement establishes
the Commission for Environmental Protec-
tion.19 It lays out the structure and functions
of its main component, the Council.2 The
Cooperation Agreement requires that the
Council be composed of cabinet-level repre-
sentatives of the Parties and convene at least
annually.21 Additionally, it provides that the
Council must hold regular public meetings
and that all of its decisions and recommenda-
tions must be public unless the Council
specifically decides otherwise? The Coun-
cil may create committees and may act to
exercise "its functions as the Parties may
agree. 2" The U.S. Congress has allocated
$5 million to spend on the U.S.'s share of
assessments to the operation of the Com-
mission until 1996.24
The Council serves as a forum for
environmentaldiscussionand promotes Party
cooperation.2s It oversees implementation
of theCooperationAgreement.' The Coun-
cil also oversees the Secretariat and ap-
proves the Commission budget." The Co-
operation Agreement lists eighteen specific
policy areas in which the Council should
make considerations and recommendations
related to environmental protection.2" These
include considering areas such as pollution
techniques, specific pollution levels, and the
sharing of environmental technology."
The Cooperation Agreement also re-
6 NAFTA: Bentsen Offers Border Plan, GanvmaE, Sep. 14, 1993; Agreements Signed, supro note6, at *2; Daniel Krainin, Environmentalists Should Join in Vigorous
Campaign for NAFTA, Antz. REPauuc, Oct. 6,1993, atB6. See alsoJerry Taylor, Baseless Fears of Accords, WASH. Tes, Sep. 9,1993, at G3 (approving of the Cooperation
Agreement because it appears to lack real teeth or power, not because it possesses power).
7 The agreement's official name is the "Agreement Between the Govemment of the United States of America and the United Mexican States Concerning the Establishment of
a Border Environment Cooperation Commission and a North American Development Bank", 1994 WL 46884 (Nov. 16, 18,1993) [hereinafter BECC), implemented at 19 U.S.C.
§ 3473 (1993).
1s See Carol Browner, News Release, 1993 WL 438469 (EPA).
1 Cooperation Agreement, supra note 1, art. 8. Funding for the Commission will be divided equally among the Parties. Id. art. 43.
2 Id. arts. 9-10.
2 1 Id. art. 9(1)-(3). It must also hold special sessions at any Party's request. Id. art. 9(3)(b).
22 Id. art 9(7.
2 Id. art. 9(5Xa), (c).
2419 U.S.C. § 3473(a)(2) (1993).
a Cooperation Agreement, supra, note 1, art. 10(lXa), ().
' Id. art. 10(l)(b).
2 Id. art. 10(lXc), (e).
a Cooperation Agreement, supro, note 1, art. 10(2)(a)s). They indude the following:
(a) comparabilitycof techniques and methodologies for data gathering and analysis, data management and electronicrdata commnunications on matters covered by this Agreement:
(b) pollution prevention techniques and strategies;
(c) approaches and common indicators for reporting on the state of the environment;
(d) the use of economic instruments for the pursuit of domestic and intemationally agreed environmental objectives;
(e) scientific research and technology development in respect of environmental matters;
() promotion of public awareness regarding the environment;
(g) transboundary and border environmental Issues, such as the long-range transport of air and marine pollutants;
(h) exotic species that may be harmful;
(i) the conservation and protection of wild flora and fauna and their habitat, and specially protected natural areas;
0) the protection of endangered and threatened species;
(k) environmental emergency preparedness and response activities;
(I) environmental matters as they relate to economic development;
(m) the environmental implications of goods throughout their life cycles;
(n) human resource training and development in the environmental field;
(o) the exchange of environmental scientists and officials;
(p) approaches to environmental compliance and enforcement;
(q) ecologically sensitive national accounts;
(r) ecolab ; and
(s) other matters as it may decide.29 Id.
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quires the Council to cooperate with the
NAFTA Free Trade Commission.' The
Council must provide consultation when one
Party believes another is lowering its envi-
ronmental standards to attract investment."
In this consultation, the Cooperation Agree-
ment mandates that the Council discourage
such activity." In other environmentally-
related trade disputes, the Council must try
to get the Parties to avoid the dispute, make
recommendations to the Free Trade Com-
mission to identify technical experts to help
the situation, and aid the Commission in any
other way.3
When govemment projects may have
international environmental effects, the Coun-
cil must advise the Parties involved.Y If a
project is likely to produce adverse effects in
another Party's territory, the Council is re-
quired to make an environmental impact
assessment of the project and recommend
steps to mitigate the potential adverse ef-
fects.
The Council must encourage the estab-
lishment of national administrative channels
by the Parties to seek the prevention or
reduction of "transboundary pollution on a
reciprocal basis."m To this end, it is required
to develop recommendations regarding ac-
cesstocourtsandadministrativeremediesby
residents of a foreign Party." This includes
recommendations regarding rights and rem-
edies in those venues.?8 The Council is also
required to encourage the Parties to enforce
their own laws and promote technical coop-
eration among themselves." It must also
promote public access to governmental in-
formation on the environment.?
2. The Secretariat
The Cooperation Agreement sets forth
provisions for the Secretariat. The Executive
Director runs the Secretariat and is elected to
non-consecutive three-year terms.41 The
Executive Director is given the power to
head and appoint, subject to the Council's
veto, a staff chosen from a list of candidates
prepared by the Parties. 42 The office of
Executive Director rotates among citizens of
each of the Parties.43 Members of the
Secretariat may not receive any influence or
instructions from their home country when
performing their duties." The Secretariat
prepares the budget and submits it for ap-
proval to the Council.45 The Secretariat also
must provide technical and operational sup-
port to both the Council and individual Par-
ties.4
The Secretariat must prepare and re-
lease the annual report of the Commission,
subject to review by the Council.' The
content of this report includes the
Commission's activities and budgetaswell as
a periodic report on the state of the Parties'
environments." Additionally, the report
must contain information on Party compi-
ance with the Cooperation Agreement, in-
cluding environmental enforcement49 Fi-
nally, the Secretariat may promulgate its
own environmental reports, unless the Coun-
cil objects or the subject involves the failure
of a Party to enforce its own laws."
3. The Joint Public Advisory
Committee
The Agreement establishes the Joint
Public Advisory Committee (Committee),
which must be comprised of 15 members
selected by each Party's National Advisory
Committee.s' The Committee meets at least
once a year and may advise the Council on
technical, budgetary, or other information
which the Secretariat preparesO The Com-
mittee may also provide its own information
to the Secretariatra
3 [d. art. 10(6).
3% Id. art. 10(6Xb).
3 Id.
3a Id. art. 10(6%c).
34Id. art. 10(7).3' Id.
36 Id. art. 10(8).
" Id. art. 10(9).
3' Id.
"Id. art. 10(4).
0 Id. art. 10(5).
41 Id. art. 11(1).
42 Id. art. 11(2X3). The list must be prepared with "due regard" to selecting an "equitable" proportion of nationals from each Party. Id. art. 121(2c).
43 Id. art. 11(1).
4 Id. art. 11(4).
s Id. art. 11(6).
4 Id. art. 11(5). (7). The Secretariat shall keep in confidence information which non-governmental entities submit to it as confidential. Id. art. 11(8).
4 id. art. 12(1).
4 Id. art. 12(2Xa). (b), (e). (f), (3).
9 Id. art. 12(2)(c). Additionally, non-govemmental information and Commission recommendations should be included. Id. art. 12(2)(d).
50 Id. art. 13.
ss Id. art. 16(1). Article 17 suggests that the Parties set up these committees to advise their governments on the implementation and elaboration of the Agreement.
62 Id. art 16(3X5). The Secretariat is required to provide copies of proposed budgets and other documents that it prepares. Id. at. 16(6). Also factual records may be made
available to the Committee by a two-thirds vote of the Council. Id. art. 16(7).
53 Id. art. 16(5). All reports must be provided in French, English, and Spanish. Id. art. 19. The actual text of the Cooperation Agreement in each of these languages are equally
authentic. Id. art. 51.
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* Objectives
The Cooperation Agreement begins
listing objectives in the Preamble.-A The
Preamble consists of one page of notable
positions of the Parties." The Parties ini-
tially proclaim their "sovereign right" to ex-
ploit their own resources" This right is
restricted to exploitation which does not
damage environments outsideof each Party's
national boundaries? The Parties also "re-
affirm" the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on
the Human Environment and the Rio Decla-
ration of 1992.5 The United States did not
sign the latter treaty.so Under the NAFTA,
the Parties apparently mayact in accordance
with certain provisions of selected environ-
mental pactss? The Parties similarly "recon-
firm" the environmental goals and objec-
tives, including environmental enhancement,
in the original NAFTA.e6 The Preamble
concludes by noting that the Parties are
"convinced of the benefits to be derived from
a framework, including a Commission," to
foster environmental conservation and en-
hancement.62
The Cooperation Agreement provides
a specific list of objectives, labeled as such,
stating the general goals of the Parties,
including some listed in the Preamble.6
They agree to foster conservation and im-
provement of the environment and promote
sustainable development with "mutually sup-
portive environmental and economic poli-
des."" They plan to achieve this by enhanc-
ing and strengthening environmental regula-
tions, enforcement, and cooperation be-
tween them." The Parties also pledge to
support the environmental goals of the
NAFTA and "avoid creating trade distortions
or new trade barriers . . . ."6 None of these
objectives is accompanied by any type of
penalty provision.67
* General Obligations
The Cooperation Agreement creates
some general obligations for the Parties.
First, they agree that each will prepare public
reports on the state of the environment,
although the Agreement does not say how
often these are required." The Parties also
agree to "develop and review environmental
emergency preparedness measures" and
promote education and the research of envi-
ronmental matters.69 The Cooperation
Agreement also requires Parties to conduct
environmental impact assessments and to
use economic tools to reach environmental
goals most efficiently.'o
The Cooperation Agreement states that
each Party must consider any recommenda-
tion regarding a specific pollutant level made
by the Council." Each Party must also
consider prohibiting the export to other
Parties of chemicals which are banned in its
own country2 The Agreement requires
s4 Id, Preamble.
* See id.
" Id. This right was previously declared in the Stockholm and Rio de Janeiro Declarations on the environment See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. See also Ranee
Khooshie Lal Panjabi, From Stockholm to Rio: A Comparison of the Declaratory Principles of International Enuironmental Law, 21 DEaw. J. Inr'L L 215, 229-30 (1993).
5 Cooperation Agreement, supra note 1, Preamble.
a Id. The Stockholm Declaration of the United Nation Conference oh the Human Environment, consisting of twenty-six principles and a preamble was the first major international
environmental treaty. See Panjabi, supra note 56, at 216. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development is a more far reaching document on the environment. Id. at
273. FormerPresident Bush refusedtosigntheagreementdespitesevereciticismbyenvironmentalists. He claimedthat certainprovisions threatened theAmerican biotechnology
industry. Id. at 245 n.118.
5 Paniabi, supra note 56, at 245 n.118.
60David Voigt, Note, The Maquiladora Problem In the Age of NAFTA: Where Will We Find Solutions, 2MNm. J. GIBAL. TRADE 323, *17-18 (1993). The original NAFIA
provided that obligations of the Parties regarding endangered species, ozone-depleting substances, and hazardous wastes under specified international agreements will take
precedence over NAFTA provisions. See Eleanor Roberts Lewis, The North American Free Tmde Agreement: Historical Background and Summary of the Fast Track
Process, 653 PRAC. L INST./COwol. 23, at end (1993). But see generally James E. Bailey, Free Trade & the Environment - Can NAFTA Reconcile the Enuronment?, 8
Am. U. J. Ir'iL L & Pot'Y 839 (1993). However, only certain environmental provisions of selected treaties will take precedence over the NAFTA. Voigt, supra this note.
6 Cooperation Agreement, supro note 1, Preamble. See infmo note 200 and accompanying text for a criticism of the NAFTA's lack of environmental goals.
12 Cooperation Agreement, supra note 1, Preamble. In the Preamble the Parties also note that they are:
CONVINCED of the importance of the conservation, protection and enhancement of the environment in their territories and the essential role of cooperation in these areas in
achieving sustainable development for the well-being of present and future generations;
* * *
EMPHASIZING the importance of public participation in conserving, protecting, and enhancing the environment;
NOTING the existence of differences in their respective natural endowments, climatic and geographical conditions, and econonic, technological and infrastructural capabilities;(and)
RECAllING their tradition of environmental cooperation and expressing their desire to support and build on intemational environmental agreements and existing policies and
laws, in order to promote cooperation between them. ... "
Id.
3 Id. art 1.
'
4 Id. art 1(b)
aId. art. 1(c), (f).j).
"Id. art (d)-e). They also agree to promote "transparency and public participation in the development of environmental laws, regulations and policies . . .economically efficient
and effective environmental measures; and . . . pollution prevention policies and practices.' Id. art. (h)-(.
6 Id.
a Id. art. 2(lXa).
"Id. arL 2(lXbXd).
"Id.art.2(1X)ef)
nId. art 2(2). See articles 9 and 10 for a general description of the CounciL
72 Id. art. 2(3).
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each Party to give notice of such banned
substances and other highly restricted sub-
stances.73
A further provision of the Cooperation
Agreement requires each Party to provide
"high levels" of environmental protection
and to continually enhance that protection.74
However, the Parties recognize again that
each has the right to set its own levels of
protection.75 Each Party shall publish all
legal and regulatory measures and proposals
relating to the Cooperation Agreement, and
if possible, provide individuals and each
Party a right to be heard on such proposals.7 6
The Cooperation Agreement suggests
that the Parties amicably reconcile any differ-
ences arising under its provisions." The
only mandatory provision for this sugges-
tion, however, is that a Party must provide
information which another Party requests if
it pertains to environmental measures.75 The
Parties must also provide information re-
quested by the Council or Secretariat, unless
doing so violates that Party's law or the Party
considers it unduly burdensome. 9
* Enforcement of Environmental Laws
1. In General
The Cooperation Agreement requires
each Party to enforce its own environmental
laws and then provides a list of suggested
actions, such as the appointing of inspectors
and the issuance of permits and licenses."
Each Party must have a working form of
enforcement proceedings and sanctions.81
The Cooperation Agreement also provides a
list of suggested sanctions82
The Cooperation Agreement provides
other general enforcement rules. No official
of one Party may enforce environmental
laws in another Party's territory83 The
Cooperation Agreement also prohibits a
Party from providing a remedy in its own
laws for violations of this agreement by
another Party. But, private persons shall
be able to request state investigation of
environmental violations and have access to
availablejudicialoradmiistrativeremedies.8a
Such remedies must include private lawsuits
for damages and injunctions, sanctions,
monetary penalties, plant closures, emer-
gency orders to mitigate damages, and re-
quests to protect the environment according
to a Party's law." If a Party believes another
Party is persistently failing to enforce its
environmental laws, the Cooperation Agree-
ment provides a resolution process for the
dispute, described below, which includes
possible penalties.
2. Procedure
The Cooperation Agreement includes
a separate article on Procedural Guarantees.
The guarantees require that the above-men-
tioned dispute proceedings: (1) "comply with
due process of law;" (2) are generally open to
the public; (3) allow the litigants to support
their position with evidence; (4) are not
unreasonably expensive, complicated, or
lengthy; and (5) are governed by impartial
tribunals." The Cooperation Agreement
also requires written decisions based on the
evidence heard in such proceedings, and the
opportunity for review."
No provisionof theCooperationAgree-
ment requires a Party to disclose confidential
government information or any privately
protected information."9 Nor are the Parties
required by any provision to disclose infor-
mation related to their National Security or
take any actions which would compromise
national defense or the implementation of
any nuclear arms treaties.90 The Coopera-
tion Agreement does require the Commis-
sion to handle any information held in con-
fidence in the same manner as the Party
providing it handles it.9
The Cooperation Agreement provides
a few rules of diplomacy.' 2 It requires the
Parties to extend those "privileges and im-
a Id.
7 Id. art. 3.
5 Id.
76Id. art. 4. This includes all 'laws, regulations, procedures and administrative rulings" and any such proposed measures. Id.
7 Id. art. 20(1), (2). (4).
" Id. art 20(3).
7 Id. art. 21(1)42). If the latter, the Secretariat shall revise the question, but the Party may still refuse if it supplies its reasons to the Secretariat Id. art. 21(2)43).
"fd.art.5(1).Ohesuggestedrechanismsincude-(1)monitoringcmpliaeandinvestgatingsupectedvioltonskindithougho-siteinsp on,(2)seekingasuaes
of voluntary compliance and compliance agreements, (3) publicly releasing noncompliance Information, (4) issuing bulletins or other periodic statements on enforcement, (5)
promoting environmental audits, (6) requiring record keeping and reporting, (7) providing or encouraging mediation and arbitration, (8) initiating judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative proceedings to seek appropriate sanctions or remedies, (9) providing for search, seizure or detention, or (10) issuing administrative orders, including preventative,
curative or emergency orders. Id.
81 Id. art. 5(2) - (3).
2 Id. art. 5(3). The list indudes "compliance agreements, fines, imprisonment, Injunctions, the dosure of facilities, and the cost of containing or cleaning up pollution." Id. art.
5(3)(b).
33 Id. art. 37.
i Id. art. 38.
* Id. art. 6(2).
" Id. art 6(3).
" Id. art. 7(1), (4).
* Id. art. 7(2)H3).
89 Id. art. 39(1).
90 Id. art. 42.1 Id. art. 39(2).
"See id. art. 44.
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nunities" to the Executive Director and the
iecretariat's staff which are "necessary for
he exercise of their functions."93
Under the Cooperation Agreement,
ion-governmental parties may request that
he Council investigate alleged non-enforce-
nent of environmental laws by a Party.9"
3uch requests must be written by a clearly
dentifiable entity from one of the Parties,
2rovide sufficient information for the Secre-
ariat to review, and be aimed at "promoting
aforcement rather than at harassing indus-
Ty."" The submission must indicate that the
;omplainant has notified her own national
iuthorities." If these criteria are met, the
3ecretariat may request a response from the
Party.7 The decision to make this request
mill be based on the following factors: (1)
hether the request alleges harm to the
~omplainant; (2) whether the submission
raises issues which, with further study, could
further the Cooperation Agreement's goals;
[3) if private remedies have already been
pursued; and (4) if "the submission is drawn
exclusively from mass media reports."98 If a
response is requested, the Party will nor-
mally have 30 days to indicate whether the
matter is pending in another proceeding. If it
wishes to, it may additionally indicatewhether
the matter was previously pursued in a judi-
cial or administrative proceeding or whether
such a proceeding is still available to the
complainant.99
After review of a Party response, the
Council may instruct the Secretariat to pre-
pare a factual record or do so on its own
initiative.oo A Party may comment on the
first draft of such a record and the Secretariat
may incorporate appropriate comments into
its final submission to the Council.' 1
3. Consultations
The Cooperation Agreement sets out
important provisions for consultations and
dispute resolution by Parties where one Party
alleges a failure by another to enforce its own
environmental law.102 The first requirement
is that the complaining Party request consul-
tation with the Party or Parties which it
believes has exhibited a consistent pattern of
failing to enforce its own environmental
law.ies The Cooperation Agreement gives a
negative definition for failing to effectively
enforce its own environmental law."10 A
Party has not failed to enforce its own laws
when a Party's actions reflect a "reasonable
exercise of [its] discretion" in enforcement
actions, or when those actions reflect "bona
fide decisions to allocate resources" to other
areas of environmental enforcement.105 It
defines "environmental law" as any provi-
sion of a statute or regulation with the
primary purpose of protecting the environ-
ment or preventing danger to humans caused
by pollutants, environmental contaminants,
and hazardous or toxic substances or
wastes.'06 It excludes provisions directly
related to worker safety or health and some
relating to harvesting natural resources, which
is an area commonly thought of as environ-
mental law. 07 Generally, a third Party may
join in consultations if it has an interest in the
outcome.xes
If the Parties are unable to resolve their
dispute within a specified time period,' 0 any
disputant may request a special Council
session.n0 Upon such request, the Council
will convene and may use dispute resolution
techniques such as mediation, or it can call
experts to aid in consultation."' It may also
make public or private recommendations or
refer the Parties back to any separate agree-
ment which "more properly covers]" the
matter.112
4. Arbitration
If.the matter is not resolved within 60
days after the Council has assembled, the
Council may convene an "arbitral panel" if
the alleged failure relates to a situation in-
3 Id. art. 44.
" Id. art. 14.
5 Id. art. 14(1Xa)d), (f).
9 Id. art. 14(lXe).
* Id. art. 14(2).
* Id.
" Id. art. 14(3). The Cooperation Agreement defines "judicial or administrative proceeding" as a domesticjudictal, quasi-judicial, or administrative action including mediation,
arbitration, licensing, "seeking an assurance of voluntary compliance or a compliance agreement", and issuing an administrative order. Id. art 45(3). Also included is an
"intemational dispute resolution proceeding" involving the Party as a party. Id.
m Id. art 15(1M2). Note that Annec.41(2) requires the Council to take into account whether the request was submitted by a Canadian organization organized under the laws
of a province which paragraph 1 of the Annex requires to be listed. See infra notes 157-163 and accompanying text
m Cooperation Agreement, supra note 1, art. 15(5)-(6). The Council may only make such report public by a two-thrds vote. d. art 15(7).
1o2 See generally Id. arts. 22-36.
m Id. art. 22(1H2). A persistent pattern" means "a sustained or recurring" pattem of action or lack of action beginning after the time which the NAFTA took effect. January
1, 1994. Id. art. 45(1).
m Id. art. 45(1).
'
0 Id. art. 45(1)(a), (b).
m Id. art 45(2)a). Protection of the environment also includes protecting "wild flora or fauna, induding endangered species, their habitat, and specially protected natural areas.
." Id.
s'14 art45(2)(a)(iii.(b. Itadcudes 'anystatute or regulation, orprovision thereof, the primatypurposeofwhich is rnanagingthe commerciat harvestoretploitation, orsubsistence
or aboriginal harvesting, of natural resources." Id. art. 45(2)(b). The Agreement states that the primary purpose of such
a provision will be defined by the provision's purpose alone, not the purpose of the whole statute. Ed. art. 45(2)(c).
m Id. art. 2 2(3 ); Subsection 3 allows the third Party joinder unless the Council's rules prohibit it. Id.
Usually this period is 60 days unless otherwise agreed to by the disputants. Id. art 23(1)(3).
noid. The consulting Parties may set their own timetable if desired. Id. art. 23(1).
n'Id. art. 23(4Xa"b). The Council will normally convene within 20 days unless it decides otherwise Id. art 23(3).
mnd. art. 23(.
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volving some type of trade between the
Parties.113 The panel shall be comprised of
five individuals selected by the Parties from a
roster of up to 45 independent members
chosen by the Council. 14 The roster mem-
bers shall have an area of expertise in envi-
ronmental law or a field related to the dis-
pute.1 s In a two-Party dispute, both Parties
are supposed to jointly choose a panel chair-
person and then each choose two other
roster members from their opponent's
Party."' If the Parties cannot agree on
panelists, the Cooperation Agreement pro-
vides a system of lots for their selection." 7 If
there are three Parties involved, the process
is roughly the same."as
The panel's proceedings are governed
by rules established by the Council."' These
rules must include: (1) a right to be heard; (2)
the right to make written initial and rebuttal
submissions; and (3) a prohibition against
disclosing the identity of the author of major-
ity or minority panel opinions.'m The gen-
eral purpose of the panel shall be to examine
alleged non-enforcement and make findings
of fact and recommendations for resolution
of the dispute.121 The Cooperation Agree-
ment also provides that a third Party may
attend all hearings and make submissions to
thepanel.122 The panel mayalso seek expert
advice from appropriate persons, but only if
the disputants agree.'*2
The panel is normally required to sub-
mit an initial report to the Parties within 180
days of convening? 4 The report shall con-
tain any findings of fact, determinations of
whether there has been an enforcement
failure, recommendations, and any dissent.125
The Parties may then make written com-
ments on the report, and the panel, pursuant
to these reports, may reconsider their report
or make a further investigation.' 2' The panel
then sends its final report to the disputants,
who each must send it to the Council for
publication along with any extra notes they
desire to be added.'2
If thepanel findslackof enforcementby
a Party, the disputants may agree on a plan
which implements the panel's recommenda-
tions and notify the Council and Secretariat
of the plan.m Any disputant may request
the Council to reconvene the panel if the
disputants cannot agree to a plan of action
within 60 days of the final report, or if a
complaining Party feels that the defendant
Party is not completely implementing such a
plan after at least 180 days since the time of
the plan.129 If the Parties cannot agree to a
plan within 60 days of the final report, the
lastplansubmittedbythedefendantisdeemed
established by the panel.1mO When the panel
is reconvened because the Parties could not
reach an agreement, the panel must deter-
mine the sufficiency of the defendant Party's
implementation proposal.' If insufficient,
the panel must establish its own plan and
may assess a monetary enforcement accord-
ing to Article 34 of the Cooperation Agree-
ment.'32 When it is reconvened for allega-
tions of non-implementation, the panel must
decide whether the defendant Party is fully
implementing the plan agreed to, and, if not,
must make some monetary enforcement
assessment against that Party.m The Coun-
cil must reconvene the panel if a complaining
Party makes another timely written request
to determine the sufficiency of a defendant
Party's implementation program.'s '
The Cooperation Agreement limits the
amount of a monetary enforcement assess-
ment against any Party to $20 million in the
first year of the Cooperation Agreement.'S
After the first year, the limit shall be the
equivalent of seven thousandths of the total
trade between the Parties in the most recent
year in which statistics have been com-
piled.'2 ' The factors which the panel shall
u0 Id. art 24(1). A third Party may join the complaining Party within seven days of the panels formation. Id. art 24(2).
u1 Id. arts. 25-27. Individuals may not serve as panelists if they have participated in the dispute or they or their organization has an interest in the matter. Id. art. 26(2). If a
Party selectsanon-roster panelist, another Party may offera "peremptory challenge" to that person. Id.art.27(3). Ifthepanelistisbelievedtobeinviolationofthecodeofconduct
established by the Council, the Parties involved shall consult and may jointly remove the panelist Id. art. 27(4).
us Id. art. 25(2Xa).
116 Id. art. 27(1).
" Id. art. 27(1)(d).
ts Id. art. 27(2)(c).
119 Id. art. 28(1).
no Id.
121 Id. art. 28(3). This shall be the purpose unless the Parties agree otherwise shortly after the panel is convened. Id.
n2 Id. art. 29.
12o Id. art 30.
124 Id. art. 31(2Ka).
us Id. art. 31(2H3).
t' Id. art. 31(445).
" Id. at 32(1X3); The panel must submit this report within 60 days of its initial report unless the Parties agree on different time limit for the panel. Id. art 32(1).
2 Id. art. 33.
w Id. art. 34(142). The disputants have 60 days to reach an agreement Id. art 34(1). If there is neither an agreement nor such a request within 120 days, the last plan subntted
by the defendant shall be deemed the final panel plan. Id. art 34(2).
m Id. art. 34(2). It is deemed established 120 days after the final report Id.
u3 Id. art 34(4a).
m Id art 34(4Xa(ii), (b). The panel has 90 days from when it reconvenes to make such an assessment Id. art 34(4). For a summary of Annex 34, see Infre text accompanying
notes 135-138.
' Cooperation Agreement. supra note 1, art 34(5). The panel may make such an assessment within 60 days of reconvening unless the Parties agree otherwise. Id. art 34(4).
The deadline for Parties to file because of a failure to implement a plan shall be 180 days from when the Parties made an agreement or the panel adopted a plan. Id. art. 34(3).
134 Id. art. 35. The time limit for such requests is 180 days from the time of the previous determination of sufficiency. Id.
m3 Id. annex 34(1).
3 Id. Trade volume between the U.S. and Mexico totaled $65 billion in 1991. Schwenker, supra note 3, at 1364 n.52.
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consider in making its assessments include:
(1) the pervasiveness and length of time
which the Party has failed to enforce its
environmental laws; (2) the expected level of
enforcement considering that Party's re-
sources; (3) any reasons given for such faIl-
ure; (4) efforts to rectify the situation; and (5)
any other relevant factors. 13 Such assess-
ments are to be paid into a fund in the
Commission's name and expended at the
Council's direction to improve the defendant
Party's environment or environmental en-
forcement mechanisms, consistent with its
laws.'as
5. Suspension of Benefits
The Cooperation Agreement provides
measures to be taken when a Party fails to
pay a monetary assessment within 180 days
of imposition. 39 When this occurs, a com-
plaining Party may, with certain exceptions,
suspend the application of NAFTA trade
benefits to the defendant Party, up to the
amount assessed.'4 A complaining Party
may also suspend benefits if the arbitral
panel assesses a penalty based on the defen-
dant Party's failure to implement the panel's
plan. 141 When the panel makes an assess-
ment for that reason,142 the complaining
Party may only suspend benefits if: (a) the
defendant Party has been previously as-
sessed a penalty under Article 34, or (b) the
panel has previously been required to con-
struct a plan of action pursuant to a Party
request.'43 The suspending nation may in-
crease its tariffs to no higher than the lesser
of the applicable tariff rate existing immedi-
ately before the NAFTA took effect, or the
Most-Favored-Nation rate as of the date of
suspension.'" In considering which benefits
to suspend, the suspending Party shall first
attempt to suspend benefits in those eco-
nomic sectors which the defendant Party has
had persistent enforcement failure, unless
they consider it impracticable.145
When benefits are suspended, the de-
fendant Party may reconvene the panel to
determine whether an alleged deficiency has
been paid or whether the Party has actually
implemented its plan.'" Within 45 days, the
panelshall issue its reportand shall terminate
the suspension of benefits if it finds that the
defendant has complied."' The defendant
Party may also cause the panel to reconvene
to determine whether the actual suspension
of benefits exceeds the amount of the as-
sessed enforcement'48
There are special provisions for collec-
tion of assessments and enforcement of
panel determinations in Canada. 49 Those
assessments directed at Canada must be
collected by the Commission filing a certified
copy of the panel's decision in a Canadian
Court of competent jurisdiction.W The
Commission may file only if Canada has
failed to pay an assessment after 180 days,
afterwhich time the filing becomes an "order
of the court."s' The Commission shall file
the panel's decision asa complaint addressed
to either "her Majesty in right of Canada or
... in right of the province concerned." 5 2
The proceedings shall be "summary" in na-
ture and are not reviewable by Canadian
courts.' 5 ' When any panel makes a determi-
nation that Canada shall fully implement a
panel plan,'se the court where the Commis-
sion files shall refer any questions of fact or
interpretation back to the deciding panel for
final review.'ss If Canada alters these proce-
dures it shall be considered to have breached
the Cooperation Agreement.'5s
There are also special provisions for
Canada's provinces. 57 Canada must de-
dare which of its provinces it will agree to be
bound to for matters in their jurisdiction.'s
This declaration relates back to certain Ar-
ticles of the Cooperation Agreement.s 9 Any
unlisted province will limit Canada's powers
to help it under the Cooperation Agreement.
Canadawill notbeableto request: (a) consul-
m See Cooperation Agreement, supra note 1, annex 34(2).
m3 See Id. annex 34(3).
I" Id. art. 36(1).
to Id. Any suspension is subject to Annex 36, discussed infrm notes 149-156 and accompanying text. Id. Also where the assessment was made pursuant to Article 34()(b),
benefits may be suspended by another route by Article 36(2) and should not be withheld twice. Id. art. 36(lXb). If more than one Party undertakes any such suspension in lieu
of payment, the combined amount of benefits suspended shall not exceed that assessed. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 1, art. 36(3).
141 Cooperation Agreement, supra note 1, art. 36(2).
H2 See Id. art 34(5)(b).
to Id. art. 36(2). See id. art. 34, and supra notes 129-136, and accompanying text for Information regarding a panel's duty to construct a plan of action. Note that the suspension
is still subject to Annex 36. Id. art. 36(2).
144 See Cooperation Agreement, supro note 1, annex 36(BX1).
'4 Id. annex 36(BX2).
I- Id. art. 36(4).
147 Id.
48 Id. art. 36(5). The panel again has 45 days to make its report. Id.
1'9 See id. annex 36A.
Is See id. annex 36A(2).- -
s See Id. annex 36A(2Xa)b).
a See id. annex 36A(2Xd) and annex 41(6).
m See Id. annex 36A(2)(e), (gHh).
m See Id. art. 34(5Xb).
a See id. annex 36A(2)().
a See id. annex 36A(4).
-* See Id. annex 41.
158 Id. annex 41(1). Canada was supposed to provide such a list by January 1, 1994 but has not done so as of this writing. See id. See also Canadian Provinces Virtually
Exempt from Pact's Environmental Side Accord, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA), Jan. 25, 1994 [hereinafterProvnces Exempt). Environmentalists have serious doubts whether many
provinces will join now. Id.
m See e.g. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 1, art. 15.100MEP
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tations under Article 22; (b) a Council meet-
ing under Article 23; or (c) an arbitral panel
under Article 24, if such request is primarily
for a non-declared province.W Nor may
Canada request (b) or (c) unless the same
matter would arise under Canadian federal
jurisdiction in its territory, or the declared
provincesaccountforatleast55% of Canada's
Gross Domestic Product, or in the same
industry in question in Canada, the declared
provinces account for at least 55% of the
national output. 61 Likewise, however, no
Party may make a request concerning an
enforcement failure of a province unless the
province is declared under paragraph 1 and
meets the above-mentioned percentile stan-
dards." After two years of operating under
the Cooperation Agreement, the Council
shall look at the effectiveness of the provi-
sions contained in this paragraph, especially
the percentage thresholds just mentioned." 3
6. Implementation and Withdrawal
The Cooperation Agreement became
effective January 1, 1994.'" The Parties
may now agree to any amendments as long
as their internal legal processes for accepting
such amendments are satisfied." The Co-
operation Agreement also allows "acces-
sion" of new nations to the Cooperation
Agreement byagreement of theCounciland
those nations seeking tojoin."' Also a Party
may withdraw from the Cooperation Agree-
mentsix monthsaftergiving written noticeof
its intentions." 7
CRmCISMS OF THE OmGmA1. NAFTA
AND THE COOPERATION AGREEMENT's
RESPONSE
Former President Bush declared that
the original NAFTA maintained the U.S.'s
"high environmental, health, and safetystan-
dards.""' Yet there are several environmen-
tal areas in which critics say the NAFTA is
deficient.'6 Some of these concerns were
addressed by the subsequent Cooperation
Agreement while others were not
* The Commission
BeforetheCooperationAgreementex-
isted, commentators stated that one of the
most serious deficiencies in the original
NAFTAtextwas the lack of any environmen-
tal rulemaking body for the Parties"'7 One
commentator, Steve Chamovitz, suggested
a tripartite commission which would be rep-
resented by Party governments, businesses,
and members of the general public.' 7' This
commissionwould recommend environmen-
tal policies and standards to individual Par-
ties who would retain the right to accept or
reject them.172
The Cooperation Agreement's Com-
mission appears to fit this bill in most re-
spects. The Council and Committee are
represented by all three Parties and the head
of the Secretariat rotates among thern.'7
While the Council must be composed of
government officials, members of the public
are supposed to make up the membership of
the Committee. There is no specific inclu-
sion of business officials, but they are not
excludedeither.WhileChamovitzenvisioned
environmentalists and business-persons
working side-by-side with bureaucrats,' 4 the
Commission separates them a bit. More
importantly, the Commission is empowered
to seek technical advice and make recom-
mendations on general and specific environ-
mental standards and practices. It generally
appears to cover most of Chamovitz's con-
cerns.
* Lowering Environmental Standards
Perhaps one of the most popular criti-
cisms is that the NAFTA will not prevent a
Party from lowering its environmental stan-
dards in order to secure investment.s17
1. Enforcement
Before the Cooperation Agreement,
many NAFTA opponents believed that "the
agreement would make it easy for U.S.
companies to relocate to MeKico to take
advantage of poor environmental enforce-
ment"' 7 ' House Majority Leader Richard
Gephardt demanded that the NAFTA pro-
vide "an effective remedy" to ensure such
enforcement'" The Cooperation Agree-
us Id. annex 41(3). However, the provinces will not lose any trade benefits under the main NAFrA. See Provinces Exempt, supra note 158.
16 See Id. annex 41(4).
16 Id. annex 41(5). This provision looms larger after implementation because the percentile threshold may not be reached. See Provinces Exempt, suprm note 158.
to See Cooperation Agreement, supra note 1. annex 41(8).
'" See Id. art. 47.
ms Id. art. 48.
t" See Id. art. 49. The new Parties must gain approval of Joining by their own legal processes. Id.
17 Id. art. 50.
'"Remarks Announcing the Completion of Negotiations on the NAFTA, 28 Wea.Y Cow. PRs. Doc. 1422 (Aug. 12, 1992).
m'See infra notes 170-265 and accompanying text.
noChamovitz, supra note 6, at *17.
Pt 1d.
In Id.
17n Cooperation Agreement. supro note 1. arts. 9, 11.
4 Charnovitz, supra note 6, at *17.
us Foronly, supra note 4. at *10; Chamovitz, supro note 6, at *14; Lewis, supra note 60, at *89.76 Foronly, supra note 4, at *10.
I" Tim Golden, US. Sees Side Accords Set for Trade Pact by August, N.Y. TuEs, July 23, 1993, at DS.
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ment addresses this concern at length by
requiring each Party to enforce its own
environmental laws, suggesting enforcement
mechanisms, and requiring private access to
enforcement proceedings and remedies.178
More importantly, it provides a framework
for consultations and the eventual arbitration
of situations where the U.S. thinks Mexico is
"winking" at enforcement of its environmen-
tal laws.1 7' An arbitration panel will order a
plan of action if it finds a lack of enforcement
by a Party and the disputants cannot agree
on such a plan.8 0 When a plan is not fully
implemented, the Cooperation Agreement
provides for monetary penalties.' 8 These
enforcement provisions give the NAFTA
teeth, answering the critics of its initial form.
However, not all the critics are sure the
proceedings will run as planned.
A recent development on the highly
polluted NewRiverhighlights concerns about
Mexico's failure to enforce its environmental
laws.18" The river runs into imperial County,
California after flowing north through
Mexicali, Mexico in the maquiladora re-
gion.'** Its waters, which have been labelled
a Mexican sewer, are extremely t6xic. Re-
cently, sheriffs discovered a corpse in the
riverwhich appeared asthoughthedecedent
had been brned to death.'" Actually, there
had been no fire; the water had simply
burned off the corpse's skin.1ss
Foryears ImperialCountyofficials have
asked for federal assistance to no avail.es6
Now they are asking the government to
engage the Cooperation Agreement's provi-
sions on requiring Mexico to enforce its own
environmental laws.'" Experts are worried
that the language: "a persistent pattern of
failure to enforce," will be interpreted nar-
rowly or that Mexican laws will not address
the problems.2ss If either happens, the
Cooperation Agreement would not provide
the power to address the alleged enforce-
ment failure.
One expert believes Mexico can take
advantage of a large loophole by claiming
that more pressing environmental problems
require the use of its limited resources.'
Officials feel the New River problem is also a
test of how dedicated the Clinton Adminis-
tration is to using the new framework in a
potentially adversarial manner against
Mexico.'" If the Administration does pursue
the matter, it is likely that the two govem-
ments willwork out a plan of actionunderthe
Cooperation Agreement. If no such plan is
constructed, neither the Council nor an arbi-
tration panel will find for Mexico under the
loophole mentioned above.
Apparently, however, the EPA has ini-
tially rejected, or at least postponed most of
the County's pleas to invoke the Coopera-
tion Agreement.' 9' The EPA explained that
NAFTA enforcement provisions "are of lim-
ited utility" now because necessary struc-
tures are not fully in place.192 They also
noted that Mexico may not have any en-
forcement liability as of that time because the
Cooperation Agreement requires a persis-
tent pattem of non-enforcement since Janu-
ary 1, 1994.1" The EPA did suggest,
however, that Imperial County seek investi-
gation of the problem by Mexico under the
Cooperation Agreement provision requiring
Mexico to give "due consideration" to such
requests.19" This decision appears to delay
evaluationoftheeffectivenessoftheNAFTA's
and Cooperation Agreement's enforcement
provisions.
2. Lowering Legal Protection
What happens if Mexico has no laws to
enforce in this type of situation? What if
Mexico decides to lower its actual regulatory
or legal levels of protection? Former EPA
Director William Reilly conceded to Con-
gress that the U.S. could not impose any
sanctions on goods manufactured under re-
laxed environmental standards in Mexico. 95
Criticism then focused on how the NAFTA
onlystated that Parties "should" refrain from
lowering their environmental standards in-
stead of using the word "shall.""' The
NAFTA itself provided only for consultations
between the Parties, which the Council must
I" See supra notes 102-163 and accompanying text Congressman Robert Matsui expressed his fear that under NAFTA Mexico could "wink and not enforce its own laws to
attract our businesses." Forony, supra note 4, at *10.
m See supra notes 128-132 and accompanying text.
t See supra text accompanying notes 133-138.





w Id. at A23.
u Id.
m Id. (citing the comments of Robert F. Housman of the Center for International Law in Washington, D.C.) See also supra text accompanying note 105.
"o Lavelle, supra note 182, at A23. - - .
'91 U.S-Mexico Borden California County's Test Rule Request Denied, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA), Mar. 25 1994. The EPA issued its decision with a concurrent plea to improve
conditions under U.S. law. Id.
292Id.
"o Id. The public docket (oppts-211035A) and record (AR-2194001) are on file at the TSCA Nonconfidential Information Center in Washington, D.C., and may be used in an
appeal to the federal courts. Id.
"'See 59 Fed. Reg. 13721-01.
us Foronjy, supra note 4, at *10.
See Chamovitz, supra note 6, at 14. Note that the Canadian government's proposal to use "shall" was rejected by the Bush Administration. Id.
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aid in.rn What else does the Cooperation
Agreementdo under these circumstances? It
provides no direct sanctions as it does for
enforcement failures. It does, however, pro-
vide some indirect techniques.
First, one of the goals of the Coopera-
tion Agreement is to strengthen cooperation
to "better conserve, protect, .and enhance
the environment" and improve existing envi-
ronmental laws and regulations." Other
objectives include promoting development
through "mutually supportive environmen-
tal and economic policies" and pollution
preventing policies and practices."' One
criticism of the NAFTA was that it provided
no set of environmental goals to go with its
provisions on the environment. 0 These
public goals could be used to bring domestic
or international pressure to bear on the
Mexican government if it relaxes regulations.
The political opposition within Mexico could
show that by allowing more pollution, the
government is failing to live up to its rhetoric
at the expense of the Mexican environment
and people.
The Parties and the Commission must
both prepare public reports on the state of
their national environments.20' This provi-
sion might allow the type of public scrutiny
that would force the government to increase
protection.
Perhaps the most important mecha-
nism to prevent lowering environmental stan-
dards is the power of the Council to make
formal recommendations regarding limits on
specific pollutants and public access to envi-
ronmental information and decision-mak-
ing.202 This provision is persuasive in that it
only requires the Parties to consider such
recommendations. However, it could be an
effective tool when used to bring more public
pressure to bear on a recalcitrant govern-
ment
All these persuasion devices could be
effective in other ways. If Mexico lowers a
certain pollution standard and fails to adopt
the Council's recommended standard, pri-
vate organizations in either country could
boycott goods made in particular polluting
industries. Boycotts are also possible on
investment in polluting industries.
While none of these provisions is a fail-
safe to prevent lowering standards, they
represent a fairly unique framework to ad-
dress the problem. The Parties also have the
ultimate option of withdrawing from the
NAFTAaltogether.mo Suchan impliedthreat
by the U.S. would likely have Mexico fairly
begging to comply with its recommenda-
tions. Of course, such a threat may not be as
compelling coming from Canada or Mexico
to the U.S.,20 but with increased trade it may
prove to be.
These hortatory provisions may also be
preferable to mandatory ones for several
reasons. There appears to be a fundamental
conflict between ensuring that all Parties
maintain certain protection levels and pre-
serving national sovereignty.205 Note how
the right to set one's own pollution levels
would be affected if the U.S. could compel
Mexico to set certain levels. Additionally, the
U.S. government may not have the power to
limit state competition for investment. 206
Another concern is whether a mandatory
rule would be a deterrent to the Parties
raising their standards in the future
Supporters of NAFTA also point to
unilateral improvements by Mexico in en-
forcing their own laws and promulgating
regulations, and that such improvement will
increase as Mexico becomes more prosper-
ous.m0 One example of this is that while
Mexico environmentally licensed only 6% of
its maquiladora plants in 1987, it licensed
75% in 1992.m0 This increase indicates that





by the Bush Administration, Ambassador
Carla Hills, who headed the U.S. negotiating
team, claimed that it would actually "im-
prove the environment."210 Many who
thought the increase in commerce would
comeatthe cost of the Parties' environments
challenged this claim before the Coopera-
tion Agreement came into exiStenCe.211 MS.
Hills based her assertion both on certain
environmental provisions in the NAFTA and
the assumption that as Mexico becomes
more prosperous it will enhance protection
measures."2 This section of the Comment
Id. See supra notes 30-32.
u Cooperation Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1(c), ().
" Id. art. 1(b), 0).
See Charnovitz, supra note 6, at *16. See generally Bailey, supra note 60.
20 See supm note 47-48, 68 and accompanying text
m See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
Cooperation Agreement, supra note 1, art. 50. A withdrawing Party must give six months notice before doing so. Id.
m American exports to Meico constitute approximately one percent of the U.S. GDP. See Schwenker, suprm note 3, at 1364 n.52.
mSee Stephen Fidler, Survey of North American Free Trade, Fowic. Te2s, May 12,1993, at 31. See also Matthew Hoffman and James Sheehan, NAFTA Naysayers...
and Eager Persuaders, WAsi. ToMEs, Oct. 12,1993, at AlS (opposing any supranational powers in the Commission on grounds that it will empower bureaucratic special interests
of the left).
= Chamovitz, supra note 6, at *15 (discussing difficulties in such a provision).
m See Infra text accompanying notes 213-219 for discussion of provisions in the NAFTA for environmental standard enhancement. See supro text accompanying notes 63-
75 discussing the Agreements related provisions.
0 See Infrm text accompanying notes 210-212; see also News Release, 1993 WL 438469 (E.PA) (noting progress in border pollution and the development of a hazardous
waste tracking system).
2" 24 ENvT. Rep. 16 (BNA).
210 Chamovitz, supra note 6, at *13.
21 Id.
=2 See id. at *13, *16.
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very briefly reviews environmental provi-
sions in the NAFTA text which have not
already been mentioned, with the purpose of
examining their weaknesses. It will then
discuss how the Cooperation Agreement
addresses those weaknesses.
One of the most significant provisions
is the principle that the Parties should strive
to "upwardly harmonize" their environmen-
tal standards, using international standards
as a minimum baseline213 NAFTA also
exhorts the Parties, as does the Cooperation
Agreement,214 to mutually enhance protec-
tion of the environment and human, animal,
and plant life. 215 Some praise this principle
as a significant improvement over the
GATT, 21 6 which has been criticized as lean-
ing towards downwards harmonization. 217
However, it must be noted that the NAFTA
uses "should" for this principle instead of
"shall" so that there is no treaty remedy for
a Party's failure to act under the principle.
The Cooperation Agreement does not rem-
edy this situation, except to reemphasize the
encouragement of the principle.218 In re-
sponse to a Party lowering its environmental
standards, the other Parties' recourse would
likely. be by methods of persuasion, as ex-
plained above. 219
Anotherproblem environmentalistssaw
in the NAFTA text was a lack of any frame-
work to control border pollution and coordi-
nate dean-up, especially between Mexico
and the U.S. 0 Looking at the smoke from
Mexico's new Carbon I power plant flowing
into Big Bend National Park, it appears that
the problems arising from international envi-
ronmental impacts will be with us as long as
national boundaries exist.221 The Coopera-
tion Agreement Preamble suggests an at-
tempt to tacldeenvironmental boundary prob-
lems.2 2 It limits the right to exploit one's
resources to those activities which do not
affect another Party's environment.m The
Parties also recognize the "interrelationship"
of their environments, presumably recalling
problems like Carbon 1.224 Other provisions
require the Council to advise the Parties on
the transboundary environmental impact of
government projects and to encourage ad-
ministrative procedures which avoid and
reduce boundary pollution.s
Perhaps more importantly, each Party
must ensure "interested" entities the right to
due government consideration regarding in-
vestigations of possible environmental viola-
tions, as discussed above in regard to the
New River problem.m The same provision
also requires appropriate access to judicial
and administrative proceedings to enforce
that Party's law." This would apparently
guarantee foreigners who suffer harm from
polluters under a Party's jurisdiction access
to that Party's courts and administrative
proceedings. The Council mustmakeappro-
priate recommendations for the provision of
such access when a complainant has suf-
fered or is likely to suffer harm in a territory
other than from where the pollution ema-
nated.m Included is the right to request
enforcement solely for the purpose of pro-
tecting the environment, without alleging
any harm to the person requesting such
enforcement 229 It would appear, however,
that this right could be limited by changes in
the Party's law of standing?
* Bilateral Cooperation Agreements
The Border Environment Cooperation
Agreement (BECA), which establishes the
Border Environment Cooperation Commis-
sion (BECC),2 31 deals much more directly
with border pollution than the Cooperation
Agreement232 Pursuant to the BECA, the
U.S. Congress has also accepted member-
ship in the North American Development
Bank (NAD Bank).m These bilateral organi-
zations are designed to foster and fund
cleanup of the environmentally troubled bor-
der region between Mexico and the U.S.m
213 Id. at *13-14. See also NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 712(5), 713(1), 714(1), 724. For the "international standards" the NAFTA refers to, see Chamovitz, supra note 6, at
*13 n.66.
24 See supra text accompanying notes 63-75.
a
5 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 906(1).
2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.IA.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 187.
n1 See Chamovitz, supra note 6, at *14.
218 See supra text accompanying notes 63-75.219 See supra text accompanying notes 197-207.
22D See Forony, supra note 4, at *4.
as See Agreements Signed, supra note 6. Annex 45 defines the territorial boundaries of the Parties. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 1, annex 45.
m Id. at Preamble.
M Id.
4 Id.
- Id. art 10, and supra text accompanyin§ notes 34-40.
2 See supra text accompanying note 194.
I See supra text accompanying notes 26-101, explaining Article 6. Note that when defining access to courts, Article 6 limits such access to those with a "legally recognized
Interest under its law." Cooperation Agreement, supra note 1, art. 6(2).
m Cooperation Agreement, supro note 1, art 10(9).
2 Id. art. 6(3)c).
m
1
D See Id. art. 6. Because the access is limited to those with a "legally recognized interest," the Parties could apparently rewrite their laws to grant judicial access for such suits
only to their own citizens. See Id.
23 See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
2 See 19 U.S.C. § 3473 (1993) (legislation implementing the BECA and BECQ.
a See The North American Free Trade Implementation Act, § 541, 1993 WL 561211, *7-9 (N.A.F.T.A. database) [hereinaf ar NAFTA Implementatfon).
' See generally id. See also Statement of Carol M. Browner, 1993 WL 438469 (E.P.A., available in FENV-NR database), at *1 (announcing the establishment of the BECA).
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The BECC will allocate funds, some of which
will be provided through the NAD Bank, for
projects to improve the border environ-
mentm Congress has allocated approxi-
mately $56 million to fund the NAD Bank in
fiscal year 1995.m The BECC will also seek
to avoid further deterioration in this region
which will experience rapid growth with the
reduction of trade barriers.? It is expected
that the BECC and NAD Bank will be opera-
tional by the fall of 1994.m
Under the BECA, the U.S. President
will be allowed to use some of the NAD
Bank's funds to subsidize designated com-
munity adjustment and investment programs
in the border region.239 Also, the President
shall establish a public advisory committee
which will provide advice to the President
regarding the programs.2 It will be com-
prised of representatives of business, the
poor, and other non-governmental organi-
zations.241 By mixing various groups to-
gether to solve tough problems, this amounts
to another entity accomplishing the type of
.environmental remediation envisioned by
the critic Chamovitz.242
Sovereignty
Another important issue to environ-
mentalists is whether the NAFTA will invade
national sovereignty by preempting federal
or state environmental measures as barriers
to trade.243 Ambassador Hills claimed that
there will no preemption under the NAFTA
and that individual state and federal govern-
ments will be able to set their own environ-
mental standards.2" But a closer look at the
NAFTA's rules on distinguishing trade barri-
ers from environmental measures belies dis-
missing the issue so easily.245 Though the
Cooperation Agreement hardly speaks to
these issues raised by the NAFTA, they are
included here because they are so integrial to
the overall environmental scheme of the
Parties and because they have not been
subsequently addressed.
The NAFTA allows each Party to set its
own levels of environmental protection save
for two exceptions. 2 The first exception
occurs when there are "arbitrary or unjusti-
fiable distinctions in such levels in different
circumstances, where such distinctions re-
suit in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion against a good of another Party or
constitute a disguised restriction on trade."247
The second exception is that protection
regarding plant and animal disease and pests
must take into account its economic effects
as well as the cost-effectiveness of other
possible means.2" Further, such protection
measuresmustbe"necessary"toachievethe
Party's chosen level of protection and must
be based on "scientific principles."' As
noted above, the Cooperation Agreement
requires "high levels" of protection and Party
consideration of theCouncil's recommended
pollutant levels, but it provides no penalties
for failure to set such high levels?
Some environmentalists fear that
NAFTA adjudicators will narrowly interpret
the exceptions above, just as GATT adjudi-
cators have interpreted similar provisions in
the GATT.2s' However, there are some
explicit differences between the two treaties
which make the NAFTA significantly more
"green."
First, the NAFTA has no parallel to the
GATT's requirement that protection mea-
sures be the "least restrictive" to trade.252
NoristhereaparallelprovisiontotheGATT's
requirementto considerrisks towhich people
voluntarily expose themselves while setting
national protection levels.m0 Further, the
NAFTA requirement to consider cost-effec-
tiveness is limited and the "scientific basis"
requirement is stricter than the GATT's par-
allel provisions.Y There is, however, one
manner in which the NAFTA goes further to
regulate environmental measures than the
GATT. The NAFTA precludes arbitrary dis-
crimination where "identical or similar
conditions" exist, whereas the GATT forbids
it only under identical conditions.' None-
235 Id. at *7. The BECC will ensure that these projects themselves meet necessary environmental standards. Id.
m Id. § 541(b) at *8.
m7 Id. at *7.
I New Commission Predicted to Feel Effect of Environmental Justice Executive Order, 17 Inr'L EtL. REP. (BNA) 175 (1994).
2m NAFTA Implementation, supm note 233, §543(a) at *8.
Id. §543(b) at *9.
20 Id.
m See supra text accompanying notes 170-172.
" See Chamovitz, supro note 6, at '8-*10.
4 Hearing on the North America Free Trade Agreement Before the House Com. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 9, 1992) (prepared testimony of
Ambassador Carla Hills).
0 See generally Chamovitz, supra note 6, at 5-13.
"' NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 712(2).
2 Id. art. 715(3).
" Id. art. 715(2).
249 Id. arts. 709, 712(1), 712(3) and (5).
m See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
2StSeeChamovitzsupra note 6. at *5-6. BecausetheNAFrAincorporatestheGATrbyreference,somefeartheGATTstandard ofrevewwillbeusedbyNAFTAadjudicators.
See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 103(lXreaffirming the paies' obligations under GATT).
w See Chanovitz, supra note 6, at *6.
Zm See Id.
2 Id.
See Id. See also NAFrA, supm note 1, art. 712(4).
5 See Chamovitz, supra note 6. at *6, *9.
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theless, NAFTA proponents maintain that
these provisions are less likely to work a
preemption of U.S. regulations than existing
GATT measures would be.2" The U.S.
implementing legislation appears to address
this concern explicitly by stating that no
provisions of the NAFTA conflicting with
federal law shall have effect? However,
this appears to contradict the dispute resolu-
tion measures in both theGATT and NAFTA
whereby a national environmental regula-
tion can be found to violate those agree-
ments' rules against artificial trade barriers.
There are separate problems with pre-
emption of state laws under both the NAFTA
and GATT. Under the former, states do not
have Party standing.m Though the NAFTA
language may appear to do more to prevent
states from setting their own levels than the
GATT does, this may not be true.259 Yet a
question does linger, as in the GATT,2 "as to
whether the treaty provisions will have the
power to preempt state environmental
laws.261
Before the NAFTA was adopted, critics
suggested adding language to the implemen-
tiof laws which would prevent preemption
of statelaws.= When Congress enacted the
NAFTA, it decided to establish a'consulta-
tion process between the President and the
states to achieve state law conformity with
the NAFTA.m These consultations will
identify possible conflicts on an ongoing
basis but no state law will be declared invalid
unless the federal government brings an
invalidation action itself.2" This language
appears to leave more questions open re-
garding the possibility of preemption. It ap-
pears that the federal government has the
power to invalidate state regulations but is
not required to use it. If this is true, it would
appear to create a loophole for the state or
federal govemment to avoid preemption
under the NAFTA. It is unclear what would
happen if the U.S. defies a NAFTA decision
attempting to invalidate such a law. How-
ever, in such decisions under the GATT, the
U.S. has generally acquiesced without for-
mally recognizing that such power is vested
in a dispute panel.2m
CONCLUSION
The Cooperation Agreement has sig-
nificant strengths and weaknesses. In that it
provides a framework for the Parties to
consult with each other in environmental
matters and sets forth laudable goals in those
matters, it is a milestone achievement. By
requiring full enforcement of existing laws, it
also appears to be highly effective and an
improvement over the status quo. As far as
addressing the immediate and growing bor-
der pollution problem, it generally abstains,
but provides some encouragement for the
bilateral agreements which directly address
those problems. In striking a balance be-
tween removing trade barriers and retaining
national sovereignty, the Cooperation Agree-
ment generally does not address the issue,
leaving the meaning of the NAFTA some-
what vague. As a result the NAFTA perhaps
leans more toward a free trade perspective
than many would like to see, as the Bush
administration indicated it would.26
The Cooperation Agreement could
be improved by adopting a more clearly
defined standard of review to determine
whether an environmental provision is valid
under the NAFTA review measures. An-
other improvement would be to clarify the
issue of preemption, especially on the state
law level. The implementing laws do not
adequately do this. Overall, the whole
NAFTA, including the bilateral deals, will
certainly improve the environment, at least
in border areas. It should provide an incen-
tive for the Parties to effectively enforce their
environmental laws, which Mexico has only
recently done. The Cooperation Agreement
will provide a framework for improving such
enforcement and increasing technical knowl-
edge of environmental problems. It will pro-
vide an innovative public forum to discuss
intemational problems like the emissions
from the Carbon I plant and to bring political
pressure. The NAFTA itself also should im-
prove the depressed Mexican economy and
begin to provide the resources needed to
limit pollution and clean it up.
19 U.S.C. § 3312(a)(11) (1993).
See Chamovitz, supra note 6, at *9.
25 Id.
* See Id. at *9, referencing a recent decision under the GATT which the author thinks indicates the power of preemption in the GATT provisonsr,
a See Id. at *10.
2 Id.
m 19 U.S.C. § 3312(bXl).
Id. 19 U-S.C. § 3312(b).
a But see Chamovitz, supra note 4, at *9 (discussing the Beer II Gatt decision suggesting preemption.)
&e supra text accompanying notes 168, 243-265.
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